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NOTES
Failure to Communicate and Effective Assistance of Counsel: State v.
Hutchins

In State v. Hutchins' the North Carolina Supreme Court rejected an
indigent criminal defendant's claim that a breakdown in communication with his court-appointed counsel rendered that counsel's representation ineffective in violation of the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 2
The court found no error in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss his appointed lawyers and counsel's motion to withdraw, holding that the trial court was not constitutionally required,
under the facts presented, to appoint substitute counsel.' Hutchins
raises interesting and difficult questions concerning the importance of
communication between an attorney and client to the constitutional
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.
Following a shooting spree in which three law enforcement officers
were killed, James W. Hutchins was arrested and charged with three
counts of first degree murder. The defendant was found to be indigent,
and two attorneys, David Fox and Ronald Blanchard, were appointed
to represent him. Fox and Blanchard filed numerous pretrial motions
and succeeded in obtaining a change of venue and a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant. 4
After several weeks in jail awaiting trial, the defendant moved,
through his appointed counsel, that the two attorneys be discharged for
"good and sufficient reasons." After a hearing, the motion was denied.5
Shortly thereafter attorney Fox received the following letter from his
client, Hutchins:
I am fire you from my case. I'll not to court with you as my lawyer.
You have lie to my (illegible) in other words I don't need you any more
at all. That is that. Good-bye. 6
Mr. Fox responded to the letter by filing a motion asking that the
1. 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981).
2. Id. at 335-37, 279 S.E.2d at 797-98. Although this case presents many other issues, the
scope of this note is limited to the constitutional question of effective assistance of counsel.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 325-30, 279 S.E.2d at 792-95.
5. Id. at 330, 279 S.E.2d at 795.
6. Id. The version of the letter quoted in the dissenting opinion is slightly different. Id. at
360, 279 S.E.2d at 811-12.
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court dismiss him as attorney of record because "no meaningful communication" was possible between himself and the defendant. In the
motion, Mr. Fox stated that since his initial meeting with the defendant, he had met with "stiffening personal resistance" from Hutchins
which had developed into a "personal antagonism." 7
At a hearing two weeks before trial, the. defendant was asked what
complaints he had of his lawyers. He responded that they did not visit
him often enough or keep him informed of developments in the case.
Hutchins complained of Mr. Fox: "I know he's a good lawyer here in
town, but he ain't come through with nothin'." He said of both lawyers, "[T]hey promised this and promised that, and none of them have
come through.
. . . If I can't trust them now, I can't trust they any
8
more."
Mr. Fox pressed his request for discharge, saying that his conversations with the defendant had reached an "impasse," and that "things
had degenerated." He said:
Mr. Hutchins andI have reached a state where we have an absolute lack

of communication. That he has personal-a feeling personal against
me as opposed to all other persons in his acquaintance; a lack of trust.
He doesn't feel he can place trust of his situation, his case in my hands.
As a result, that hasput me in a position where-with the lack of communication am unable to prepareeffectively for the defense of this case.'

Mr. Fox specifically noted that an important potential defense would
be based on the defendant's mental status, and that he was not able to
communicate with his client concerning .that issue. Mr. Fox also noted
that the antagonism he felt from the d6fendant would adversely affect
his performance at trial and make it"very difficult to approach the case
mentally.' 0 Mr. Blanchard supported Mr. Fox's assessment, saying he
thought the defendant's animosity toward counsel would be apparent
to the jury and would work to the defendant's detriment."
At the conclusion of the hearing the trial court found that the defendant had not shown any justification for discharging Mr. Fox and2
Mr. Blanchard and denied the motion to appoint substitute counsel.'
Hutchins was convicted on two counts of first degree murder and one
count of second degree murder;' 3 he received two death sentences plus
life imprisonment.' 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument
7. Id. at 331, 279 S.E.2d at 795.

8. Id. at 331, 332, 279 S.E.2d at 795, 796.
9. Id. at 360-61, 279 S.E.2d at 812 (emphasis by the court).
10. Id. at 361, 279 S.E.2d at 812.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 334, 279 S.E.2d at 797.
13. Id. at 329, 279 S.E.2d at 794.
14. Id. at 365, 279 S.E.2d at 814 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel and that substitute counsel should have been appointed. Writing for the majority,
Justice Britt cited earlier North Carolina cases holding that the defendant is denied his constitutional right to counsel only where the lawyer's
representation is so ineffective that it renders the trial a farce and
mockery of justice," that a defendant does not have a right to substitute counsel merely because he is dissatisfied with his appointed counsel, and that in the absence of a substantial reason, substitute counsel
need not be appointed.' 6
The supreme court framed the issue of effective assistance of counsel
as a question of fault or failure on the attorneys' part in light of the
complaints the defendant had made about his lawyers. The court did
not evaluate the claim of lack of communication, the majority finding
that the defendant's complaints about the number and length of visits
were insufficient cause for dismissal. The court evaluated the performance of Mr. Fox and Mr. Blanchard from the record and found that
they had spent sufficient time and effort on the case, had conducted
"spirited motions practice," and had been "diligent in all respects" in
preparation. The majority held that their representation had been
competent and that Hutchins had not been denied effective assistance
of counsel. Therefore, according to the majority, the trial court did not
err in refusing to appoint substitute counsel.1 7
Justice Exum, in a strong dissent, viewed the case in a different light.
In his view, ineffective assistance of counsel could result, not solely
from the lack of skill or effort on the attorneys' part, but from the failure of communication between the attorneys and their client. The dissent placed great weight on the attorneys' assessment of the breakdown
in communication, and argued that the "gross deterioration" of the attorney-client relationship in this case resulted in a denial of the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Justice Exum cited
North Carolina case law for the proposition that when the attorneyclient relationship deteriorates to the point of prejudicing the presentation of the defendant's case, appointment of substitute counsel is
required.18
The issue raised in Hutchins has been raised in an increasing number
of cases since the constitutional right to appointed counsel was extended to all indigent criminal defendants by Gideon v. Wainwright 9
and its progeny.2" In view of the frequent conflicts between defendants
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 335, 279 S.E.2d at 797 (citing. State v. Sneed, 284 N.C. 606, 201 S.E.2d 867 (1974)).
303 N.C. at 335-37, 279 S.E.2d at 797-98.
Id.
Id. at 356-67, 279 S.E.2d at 810-15 (Exum, J., dissenting).
327 U.S. 335 (1963).
E.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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and their appointed counsel and the large volume of post-conviction
it is likely that courts
litigation based on claims of ineffective assistance,
2
will continue to wrestle with the problem. '
I.

DUTY TO INQUIRE

Nationally, there is a conflict of authority as to whether a trial court,
upon a defendant's request for discharge of appointed counsel or for
substitute counsel, is under a duty to inquire into the reasons for the
defendant's dissatisfaction. 22 North Carolina cases have found no error in rejecting such a request without a hearing or inquiry, 23 but the
court has stated that the "better practice" is to allow the defendant to
state his reasons, 24 and that "some situations may indeed require an indepth inquiry. '"25 If the defendant's request is made during or shortly

before trial, the potential disruption of the court's schedule may provide additional justification for denying the request.2 6
II.

MUST SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL BE APPOINTED?

In several decisions, general statements have been made as to when
appointment of substitute counsel will be required, 7 but there are no
North Carolina cases holding that a failure to appoint substitute counsel was error under the facts of a particular case.
A.

SubstantialReason

The North Carolina Supreme Court's earliest statement of a rule in
this area is phrased in the negative: "In the absence of any substantial
reason for replacement of court-appointed counsel, an indigent defendant must accept counsel appointed by the court, unless he desires to
21. It may be useful to point out that State v. Hutchins does not involve the issue of a paying
client's request to allow substitution of retained counsel. In that situation a constitutional right to
"'counsel of choice" is recognized, tempered by considerations of timeliness and delay or obstruction of the courts. State v. McFadden, 292 N.C. 609, 234 S.E.2d 742 (1977). Neither does it
present the issue of an accused's request for appointment of counsel of choice. See, e.g., Harris v.
Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 786, 567 P.2d 750, 140 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1978); Drumgo v. Superior
Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1973).
22. The denial of defendant's motion without allowing him to state the reasons for his request requires reversal. People v. Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118, 465 P.2d 44, 84 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1970).
Contra, Commonwealth v. Arkus Pharmacy, Inc., 5 Mass. App. Ct. 557, 365 N.E.2d 839 (1977).
23. State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 371-72, 230 S.E.2d 524, 528-29 (1976).
24. Id. at 372, 230 S.E.2d at 529.
25. State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348, 353, 271 S.E.2d 252, 256 (1980).
26. United States v. Price, 474 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1973); Good v. United States, 378
F.2d 934, 935-36 (9th Cir. 1976); Duncan v. State, 412 N.E.2d 770, 773 (Ind. 1980).
27. United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973); Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d
1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Grow, 394 F.2d 182, 209 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 393
U.S. 840 (1968).
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present his own defense." 28
Unfortunately, "substantial reason" is not defined. Subsequent cases
have identified several reasons that are not "substantial" such as the
failure of a lawyer to make courtroom statements requested by the defendant29 and the failure of the lawyer to prosecute an appeal upon the
defendant's request.3" A disagreement between client and counsel as to
trial tactics is not sufficient to require substitution,3 and substitute
cbunsel need not be appointed "merely because [the defendant becomes] dissatisfied with his attorney's services." 3 2 In these cases the
appointment of substitute counsel is within the sound discretion of the
trial court; while it may be done, it need not be.33
In State v. Sweezy, 3 4 the court began to state more fully the reasons
that mandate appointment of substitute counsel, adopting this statement from United States v. Calabro: "In order to warrant a substitution of counsel during trial, the defendant must show good cause, such
as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an
irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict."3 6
Sweezy introduced a list of causes warranting substitution, none of
which were found to exist in that case, and none of which have yet been
found in any reported North Carolina case.37
B.

When Present Counsel is Ineffective

In State v. Thacker,3 8 the issue of appointing substitute counsel was
addressed again and tackled head on this time. Justice Carlton's opinion contains the first direct and positive statement of a standard: "A
trial court is constitutionally required to appoint substitute counsel
whenever representation by counsel origiially appointed would
amount to denial of defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel,
that is, when the initial appointment has not afforded defendant his
28. State v. McNeil, 263 N.C. 260, 270, 139 S.E.2d 667, 674 (1965).
29. In State v. McNeil, the defendant complained, "I tell him what to say and he says other
things." The court stated that lawyers need not follow such instructions, "because to do so would
ruin the defendant." Id. at 262, 270, 139 S.E.2d at 668, 674.
30. Id. at 270, 139 S.E.2d at 674.
31. State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1976).
32. State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 371, 230 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1976).
33. Id. at 371-72, 230 S.E.2d 529.
34. 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
35. 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972).
36. Id. at 986 (citations omitted).
37. In evaluating Sweezy's claim, the court noted that the defendant did not point to "any act
or omission indicating incompetency or lack of diligence on the part of counsel," 291 N.C. at 373,
230 S.E.2d at 529, apparently including incompetence and lack of diligence as "good causes" in
the list of factors.
38. 301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980).
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constitutinal right to counsel." 3 9 This standard placed the emphasis on
evaluation of the initial counsel's role and performance. A trial court
faced with a motion for substitute counsel should determine if, for any
reason, representation by initial counsel would be ineffective, thus denying defendant's constitutional right. If so, substitute counsel must be
appointed.
III.
A.

INEFFECTIVENESS STANDARDS

Performance-OrientedStandard,Farce and Mockery, and Normal
Competency

The inquiry must now shift to an examination of standards used to
determine effective assistance of counsel. In a number of cases, the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that the right to counsel is a
right to effective representation,4" but the Court has never established a
standard to be used in judging effectiveness. 4
In State v. Hutchins the court cites its holding in State v. Sneed,4 2 that
a defendant is not denied his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel unless his lawyer's representation is so ineffective that it renders the trial "a farce and a mockery of justice."4 3 The "farce and
mockery" standard, once popular, has been abandoned by many
courts." The use of that standard was rejected by the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Marzullo v. Maryland.4 5 Its reassertion in Hutchins
prompts some discussion of its continued viability and some reflections
on the relationship between state and federal courts on constitutional
issues.
The Marzullo opinion briefly traced the history of the 'farce and
mockery" standard in fourth circuit decisions, and noted that the circuit had implicitly departed from it in favor of more specific requirements focused upon whether counsel was reasonably competent. In
Marzullo, in a holding approved by all the judges of the court, the
39. Id. at 352, 271 S.E.2d at 255.
40. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85,
90 (1955).
41. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), asserts that a defendant is entitled to "reasonably competent" advice. For a full discussion, see Smithbum & Springman, Effective Assistance of Counsel. In Quest of a Uniform Standard ofReview, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 497 (1981).
42. 284 N.C. 606, 201 S.E.2d 867 (1974). Sneed is the rare case where the ineffectiveness
issue arose at trial, on a motion to suppress a defendant's statement as having been given without
benefit of counsel. Generally, this issue arises at the appellate level. The Sneed court seemed to
agree that a denial of effective assistance of counsel would require a substitute, but found that
counsel was not ineffective.
43. Id. at 612, 201 S.E.2d at 871, quoted in State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. at 335, 279 S.E.2d at
797.
44. See Smithburn & Springmann, supra note 41, at 505 n.41.
45. 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
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court expressly disavowed the farce and mockery test and adopted a
"normal competency" standard.46 The supremacy clause of the United
States Constitution47 requires that the standards of federal courts be
applied in deciding federal constitutional questions.48 However, the
North Carolina courts continue to apply the farce and mockery standard. Still, in all cases where the North Carolina courts apply the farce
and mockery standard, an imprisoned defendant might seek relief in
the federal courts by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which
would judge the case under the fourth circuit's "normal competency"
standard. 49 Thus, the standard of normal competency will eventually
be used in evaluating effectiveness of counsel.
The "'No-Fault"Aspectof Ineffectiveness
Standards which measure counsel's competence, ability, or performance do not meet the objections raised by the defendant in Hutchins.
The claim of ineffective assistance raised in Hutchins is of a "no-fault"
nature, based not on any failure on the part of the attorneys, nor on
lack of skill or effort. The claim is founded upon the mere breakdown
of communication itself, whatever its cause. If we accept the premise
that such a "no-fault" standard can support a claim of ineffective assistance, then examination of whether Hutchin's complaints were "justified" is largely beside the point.5"
B.

Breakdown of Communication
That a breakdown or failure of communication between the attorney
and client can render counsel's assistance ineffective has been accepted
in statements of the North Carolina Supreme Court at least since the
adoption of the Calabro5 ' language in Sweezy. 52 The concept was first
C.

46. Id. at 542-45. Some of the factors used in evaluating normal competency are set forth in
Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
48. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Extraordinary remedies, such as mandamus, for forcing state courts to apply the federal standards,
are of uncertain application. The "farce and mockery" test has not been specifically rejected by
the United States Supreme Court; in fact, it is still applied in modified form by some United.States
Courts of Appeal. United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel.
Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1975).
49. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). A petitioner under that section might argue that the state
courts' stubborn refusal to apply the correct standard makes resort to the state courts an exercise
in futility, and thus excuses a failure to exhaust state remedies. See, e.g., Ham v. North Carolina,
471 F.2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973); Perry v. Blackledge, 453 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1971); Patton v. North
Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 905 (1967).
50. The court in State v. Hutchins applied a fault standard, asking whether Hutchins had any
justifiable reason for being dissatisfied with counsel, 303 N.C. at 331, 279 S.E.2d at 797, and failed
to address the contention that the dissatisfaction, whether justified or not, led to a breakdown in
communiction which rendered counsel ineffective,
51. United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972).

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1981

7

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 1 [1981], Art. 7

108

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

stated in Brown v. Craven," a federal habeas corpus attack on a California state court conviction. A dispute arose between Brown, the defendant, and the state public defender who had been appointed to
represent him. The cause of the dispute is not reported. Brown challenged, among other things, the trial court's denial of his request for
substitute counsel. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that
Brown was forced to trial with a lawyer "with whom he was dissatisfied, with whom he could not cooperate, and with whom he would not,
in any manner whatsoever, communicate." 54 The court held that in
this state of affairs the attorney was "deprived of the power to present
any adequate defense," and that to force the defendant to trial with an
attorney "with whom he has become embroiled in irreconcilable conflict is to dePrive him of the effective assistance of any counsel
whatsoever. '
The concept enunciated in Brown v. Craven and the language of that
decision have been adopted by a large number of courts,56 though the
instances in which the facts of a particular case have been found to fit
the rule are limited 7 As mentioned earlier,58 the rule was adopted by
the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Sweezy, and repeated in
State v. Thacker. 9 And although Brown was not cited in State v.
Robinson6 ° and State v. Gray,6 the principle that a deterioration of the
52. State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976). See notes 34-37 and accompanying
text supra.
53. 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1970).
54. Id. at 1169.
55. Id. at 1170. The terms "irreconcilable conflict" and "breakdown of communication" are
not synonymous, but are used without differentiation, as in Brown. This failure by the courts to
distinguish between the two may not be significant, since the first often leads to the second, and
the effect of either is the same.
56. E.g., United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Jones, 512
Thacker,
F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972); State v..
301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980); State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
57. One such rare example is United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979). In
Williams, upon the trial court's denial of the motion for substitute counsel, the defendant elected
to proceedprose. In reversing the conviction, the court held that the defendant and the attorney
were "totally incompatible" and "at serious odds," that the attorney had confirmed the troubles in
the attorney-client relationship, and that the defendant's decision on how to proceed was immaterial. Id. at1260-61.
58. See notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
59. 301 N.C. 348, 271 S.E.2d 252 (1980).
60. 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976). In Robinson, the defendant's conviction was reversed
as a consequence of an irreconcilable conflict between the defendant and appointed counsel. The
attorney was not allowed to withdraw completely, but conducted only parts of the trial, at other
times sitting silently while the defendant examined witnesses. Such fractured representation was
held to have denied the defendant a fair trial, since the conflict must have been obvious to the jury
and worked to the defendant's prejudice. The Robinson court suggests, however, that there would
be no denial of counsel if the trial court had forced the defendant to either yield to his lawyer's
decision or to forgo having an appointed attorney. Id. at 58-64, 67-68, 224 S.E.2d at 175-178, 180.
61. 292 N.C. 270, 233 S.E.2d 905 (1977). Though recognized, the principle was not applied in
Gray due to a finding that "the [trial] court ... had no reason to suspect the relationship between
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lawyer-client relationship could lead to ineffective assistance was recognized in those cases.
D.

Why Communication is Necessaryfor Effective Representation

Brown v. Craven concluded, without explication, that a breakdown in
communication or an irreconcilable conflict renders counsel's assistance ineffective. Such a statement may have been considered self-evident or obvious. But it can be argued that a lawyer might be able to
perform effectively in spite of a conflict or lack of communication with
his or her client. It is worthwhile to consider how a breakdown of communication negatively affects counsel's performance. In doing so,
statements by the courts, standards of professional conduct, commonsense arguments, and the particular arguments raised in Hutchins will
be examined.
Many decisions indicate the high value accorded attorney and client
communication. The right to communicate with counsel has been held
an important aspect of the right to the assistance of counsel.6 2 A denial
of right to counsel has been found where a defendant was prevented
from conferring with his attorney overnight, 63 or during a court recess, 64 or where the defendant was kept at a location too distant from
his attorney, making communication difficult. 65 The protection of the
attorney-client privilege suggests the importance and value which the
law places on communication between attorney and client.
Courts have consistently held that adequate preparation is a necessary ingredient of effective representation. 6 The interview with the client is an important source of information, useful to determine the
client's version of the facts, identify witnesses, aid investigation, or discover contradictions in testimony, and it has been held to constitute an
essential element of preparation. 67 "Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as often as necessary to advise him of his
rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain what potential
the defendant and his counsel to have deteriorated so as to prejudice the presentation of his defense." Id. at 282, 233 S.E.2d at 913.
62. Pugh v. North Carolina, 238 F. Supp. 721 (E.D.N.C. 1965); State v. Cradle, 281 N.C. 198,
188 S.E.2d 296, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047 (1972); State v. Hill, 9 N.C. App. 279, 176 S.E.2d 41
(1970), rev'don other grounds, 277 N.C. 547, 178 S.E.2d 462 (1971).
63. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
64. United States v. Allen, 542 F.2d 630 (4th Cir. 1976).
65. Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15 (1967).
66. Brooks v. Texas, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967); Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125 (5th Cir.
1974); State v. Alderman, 25 N.C. App. 14, 212 S.E.2d 205, appeal dismissed, 287 N.C. 261, 214
S.E.2d 433 (1975); State v. Hill, 9 N.C. App. 279, 176 S.E.2d 41 (1970). Notable here are the
numerous cases dealing with the time which appointed counsel is allowed to prepare the case.
E.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85 (1955); West v. Louisiana, 478 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973);
Calloway v. Powell, 393 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1968).
67. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849 (1968).
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defenses are available."6 8 When the client does not trust counsel or
cannot or will not communicate with counsel, there is a danger that
potential defenses or other "matters of defense" will not be discovered.
"Informed evaluation of potential defenses to criminal charges and
of his case
meaningful discussion with one's client about the realities
69
are cornerstones of effective assistance of counsel."
A lawyer also needs a good working relationship with his client in
order to evaluate the client as a potential witness. Besides the difficulty
of judging a client's possible testimony if he will not discuss it, there is
the possibility that a defendant who might otherwise be an excellent
witness in his own defense, will, if he has a conflict with his lawyer,
destroy his value as a witness by showing his hostility on the stand.7 ° It
is difficult to conduct direct examination of a defendant who dislikes or
distrusts his attorney. The results could be disastrous; hostility between
client and lawyer might preclude an important, perhaps the only, viable defense stategy. The attorneys in Hutchins argued that development of any potential defense based on mental attitude, either for the
guilt-innocence phase, or for the use in sentencing mitigation, was precluded or severely hampered by the lack of communication. 7
The high value attached to communication is also evident in the
American Bar Association Model Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
and the new ModelRules of ProfessionalConduct.72 Ethical Consideration 7-8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer
should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations."' 73 Ethical Consideration 9-2 further states that "[a] lawyer
should fully and promptly inform his client of material developments
in the matters being handled for the client." 74 Rule 1.4 of the Model
Rules, entitled "Communication," states, in part, that a lawyer "shall
explain the legal and practical aspects of a matter and alternative
courses of action to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation."7 5 The importance of this communication is underscored by the Rule 1.2 mandate that a lawyer for a criminal defendant "shall abide by the client's
decision . . .whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
68.
69.
70.
in note
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

389 F.2d at 226.
Gaines v. Hopper, 575 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (5th Cir. 1978).
Recall the reasoning in State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976), discussed
61 supra.
State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 361, 279 S.E.2d 788, 814 (1981) (Exum, J., dissenting).
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981).
Id. EC 9-2.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(6) (Proposed Final Draft 1981).
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testify." 76 Since the ultimate result in a case may hinge on the client's
decision in these matters, the flow of information and communication
between attorney and client is crucial.
E. A Right to Trusted Counsel
Trust is an essential element in the attorney-client relationship. A
client's lack of trust can certainly cause a breakdown in communication. It is difficult to imagine a situation where there is a complete lack
of trust on the client's part but a full and free flow of information between attorney and client. Trust is probably a prerequisite for a client's
full disclosure to his attorney, but situations might arise where the client's distrust developed later, at the trial stage, after all essential information had been revealed.
The importance of a client's trust in his attorney must be weighed as
an element of representation and should be preserved despite the fact
that it has no effect on the outcome. A part of the purpose in supplying
lawyers to indigent defendants may be to help them understand and be
satisfied with the legal process by creating the subjective feeling that
someone is on their side. If true, a defendant's subjective feeling that
the entire court system, including his own lawyer, is conspiring against
him becomes a relevant consideration in evaluating the effectiveness of
the attorney-client relationship. Certainly many criminal defendants
feel that way. But generally courts have not considered the defendant's
"trust" for his attorney to be a factor in judging representation, except
as it has an impact upon communication.
F.

The Effect on Performance

In State v. Hutchins, the lawyers also argued that the defendant's
hostility would not allow them to perform as well as they should at
trial." The strain of dealing with an angry, distrustful client during a
complicated trial can diminish a lawyer's effectiveness. It is difficult to
specify exactly how this works, unless it can be stated, for example, that
an obvious objection was not made because the lawyer was listening to
his client mutter that he was being sold out. Hutchins' attorney expressed the idea by saying that he needed to be in a state where ideas
could flow but the defendant's hostilities put him on the mental defensive and made him hesitant and resistant.78
Finally, it should be noted that though decisions based on the principle are few, courts have almost universally adopted the proposition that
76. Id. Rule 1.2(a).
77. 303 N.C. 321, 331, 279 S.E.2d 788, 795 (1981).
78. Id. at 331, 279 S.E.2d at 795.
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a breakdown of communication may make counsel ineffective, and
have recognized such a breakdown as good cause for substitution of
counsel.79 Differences have only arisen in determining whether a particular set of facts demonstrate such a breakdown. The readiness of
courts to accept the principle indicates widespread agreement that attorney-client communication is an essential element of effective
representation.
G. Assessment of the Relationsho
When a court is deciding whether a lack of communication or an
irreconcilable conflict has or will render counsel's assistance ineffective,
there may be some objective factors to consider, but the court must
always depend to some extent on the assessment of the attorney-client
relationship given by each of those persons.8 0
Some expression of distrust or dissatisfaction will usually be voiced
by the defendant in bringing the matter before the court. Situations
may arise where the issue is raised only by the lawyer, but in fact all of
the reported North Carolina cases involve outspoken and clearly dissatisfied defendants. 8' A court must take into account the following to
assess this discontent: the defendant's .interest or bias; a desire to avoid
all punishment and to blame a failure to do so on his lawyer; a general
hostility toward the entire court system, including the lawyer; and the
cagey defendant's use of his complaint to obstruct or delay the court's
business. All of these factors are relevant in evaluating a defendant's
opinion. But a court should remember that determining whether these
complaints are "unjustified" answers the wrong question. Unjustified
complaints may be an even stronger indication of a breakdown of
communication.
Generally, a court should assume that an attorney's assessment of the
attorney-client relationship will not be influenced by interest or bias.
Perhaps an occasional lawyer might want to escape representation in a
difficult or distasteful case.8 2 But the interest or bias factor is small
compared to the value of the lawyer's experience and detached professional judgment. Being in the daily business of relating to clients and
knowing the need for a solid attorney-client relationship, a lawyer is
more qualified to judge the condition of that relationship. An exper79. E.g., United'States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1972).
80. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1979).
81. Eg., State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, S.E.2d 788 (1981); State v. Thacker, 301 N.C. 348,
271 S.E.2d 252 (1980); State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976); State v. Robinson,
290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976).
82. Justice Exum's dissent in State v. Hutchins notes: "Nowhere does the the record indicate
that counsel's pleas to be relieved were based on mere unwillingness to handle a difficult and
undoubtedly unpopular case." 303 N.C. at 360, 279 S.E.2d at 811.
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ienced attorney should be able to qualify as an "expert witness' on the
subject. While the defendant may be unfamiliar with the proceedings
and not understand what relationship should be expected, the lawyer
can measure the relationship against many others. An attorney is also
an "officer of the court" with a duty to report truthfully on these matters.83 The attorney's opinion that a breakdown has occurred should be
given great weight by a court in evaluating such a claim, perhaps even
to the extent that, in the absence of any contradictory information, it
should be considered conclusive. On the other hand, situations may
arise where the defendant asserts a breakdown of communication but
the attorney fails to recognize it or denies it. To discount the defendant's claim solely on the basis of the attorney's statement that no such
breakdown exists would run a serious risk of depriving defendant's
rights. In such situations the attorney's assessment must be examined
more closely and a more thorough investigation is necessary to safeguard defendant's counsel rights.
H. Defendant's Refusal to Communicate
One additional and important consideration winds its way through
many cases involving requests for substitute counsel. It is frequently
noted by courts and often cited as a reason for denying substitution of
counsel, but is rarely dealt with systematically. That is the court's suspicion, fear, judgment, or conclusion that the defendant is using the
request for substitute counsel merely to interfere with or obstruct the
orderly proceedings of the court.8 4 The Sweezy case involves such an
unruly, obstructive defendant. 85 In such a case courts have not hesitated to hold that the right to counsel may not be manipulated to obstruct the administration of justice. 6
The "unruly defendant" cases are somewhat similar to the cases involving a defendant's simple refusal to communicate with counsel, but
should be distinguished. The motivation for a simple refusal to communicate might be a distrust of counsel or hostility toward the court
system, while there is no specific intent by the defendant to obstruct the
court's operation. Whatever the motivation it results in the same
breakdown of communication which renders counsel ineffective, but a
83. "An attorney actively engaged in the conduct of a trial is not merely another citizen. He
is an intimate and trusted and essential part of the machinery of justice, an 'officer of the court' in
the most compelling sense." In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 668 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.).
84. United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied, 608 F.2d 1373
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); United States v. Shuey, 541 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1976);
Lofton v. Procunier, 487 F.2d 434, 435 (9th Cir. 1973); Nunn v. Wilson, 371 F.2d 113, 117-18 (9th
Cir. 1967); United States v. Birrell, 286 F. Supp. 868, 895 (D.C.N.Y. 1968).
85. State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366, 230 S.E.2d 524 (1976).
86. Eg., Nunn v. Wilson, 371 F.2d 113, 117-18 (9th Cir. 1967).
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defendant's refusal to communicate leaves open the question of
whether effective counsel can be found. The defendant may refuse to
communicate with any lawyer. A court may have difficulty responding
to such a situation.
Many courts have held that where the failure of communication is
the result of defendant's intransigence or stubborn refusal to cooperate,
substitute counsel is not required.8 7 Those decisions generally do not
require that the trial court make a finding of defendant's refusal. A
more cautious and enlightened course would be to appoint substitute
counsel upon a showing of a breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict with initial counsel. If a similar problem develops
with the substitute counsel, the court should then inquire and find facts
as to whether the breakdown is caused by the defendant's refusal to
cooperate. 88 A trial court's finding of a refusal to cooperate as the
cause could justify forcing the defendant to trial without the assistance
of counsel.89
IV.

PRACTICE Tips

What conclusions may the practitioner draw from the Hutchins decision? A failure of communication is recognized by the North Carolina
courts as a situation which renders ineffective the assistance of appointed counsel. But Hutchins, without deleting that category, seems to
make it a "null set," since, as Justice Exum remarks in his dissent, if
these facts do not fit the bill, it is hard to imagine facts which do.9" The
prudent lawyer must assume that the North Carolina Supreme Court is
not likely to find a denial of effective assistance of counsel from breakdown in communication. In this respect, Hutchins offers assurance to
the prosecuting attorney and little encouragement to the defense
attorney.
However, Hutchins may offer some guidelines for the lawyer appointed to represent a hostile or uncommunicative client. To stand any
87. See, e.g., United States v. Arellanes, 238 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Cal. 1964); affirmed, 353
F.2d 270, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 870 (1966).
88. Some may complain that such a procedure gives a defendant two opportunities at getting
the lawyer of his choice. Certainly a trial court should not ignore indications that this issue is
being used as a mere maneuver, but in the absence of such indications, subterfuge should not be
assumed. Since the defendant must show a breakdown of communication or an irreconcilable
conflict, chances for obstruction of justice by court delay because of the refusal to cooperate are
small.
89. United States v. Sperling, 506 F.2d 1323, 1337 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962
(1975); United States v. Arellanes, 238 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D.C. Cal. 1964), affirmed, 353 F.2d 270,
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 870 (1966).
90. "If this principle has any vitality, however, and I believe that it does, this case demands
its application. If it is not to be applied here, I cannot imagine a case in which it would be." 303
N.C. at 359, 279 S.E.2d at 811 (Exum, J., dissenting).
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chance of prevailing on the substitute counsel issue, an attorney should
build an adequate record for the appellate court. First, in the defendant's name, move for a dismissal of present counsel and appointment of
substitute counsel; second, in the attorney's own behalf, file a motion to
be allowed to withdraw; third, state fully the reasons for these requests
showing how the conflict or breakdown will adversely affect counsel's
performance (these motions should be made in writing and as early as
possible); fourth, if possible, show the availability of acceptable substitute counsel. These actions were taken in Hutchins to no avail, but the
decision turns on factual judgments and another case may be decided
otherwise. 9 ' Beyond these precautions, a lawyer can only do as effective a job as possible in representing the uncommunicative defendant.
MARVIN SPARROW

91. It would be helpful to obtain as full a finding of facts on the motion as the trial court will
undertake, particularly if the absence of deliberate obstruction on the defendant's part can be
shown. This will encourage a complete factual review on appeal and increase the likelihood of
finding the need for substitute counsel.
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